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Drawing the Line at Pushing "Play": Barring Video
Montages as Victim Impact Evidence at Capital
Sentencing Trials
Alicia N. Harden'
Given the current popularity of capitalpunishment in a crime-ridden society, the
political appeal of arguments that assume that increasing the severity of sentences is
the best cure for the cancer of crime, and thepolitical strength of the "victims' lights"
movement, I recognize that today ' decision will be greeted with enthusiasm by a
large number of concerned and thoughtful citizens. The great tragedy of the decision,
however is the danger that the "hydraulic pressure" of public opinion that Justice
Holmes once described,-andthat properly influences the deliberations of democratic
legislatures-has played a role. .. in [the Court's] resolution of the constitutional
issue involved. Today is a sad day for a great institution.' -Justice John Paul
Stevens
INTRODUCTION: PEOPLE V. KELL 3
D URING the penalty phase of Douglas Oliver Kelly's capital trial forthe murder of Sara Weir,4 the state introduced a video the victim's
mother, Martha Farwell, created for the trial.s Jurors watched as the video
opened with a slide providing Sara's full name and the years of her life,
I JD expected 2011, University of Kentucky; MBA 2007, University of Texas at Dallas;
BA 2004, Southern Methodist University. Many thanks to Professor Andrea Dennis for her
tireless support and inspiration. Thanks to Professors Richard Underwood and Diane Kraft for
their comments and edits on earlier drafts.
2 Payne v. Tennessee, 5o U.S. 8o8, 867 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted).
3 People v. Kelly, 17I P3 d 548 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (zoo8). The compan-
ion case to Kelly is People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105 (Cal. 2oo8), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2oo8).
4 During the guilt phase, the jury found Kelly guilty of first-degree murder based, in
part, on the following facts: On September 15, 1993, the body of nineteen-year-old Sara, de-
composed and nude, was discovered under the bed of defendant Douglas Oliver Kelly. The
State presented evidence that the autopsy revealed Sara died from twenty-nine stab wounds,
although the evidence was inconclusive as to whether she had been sexually assaulted. Other
physical and testimonial evidence was also introduced implicating Kelly in the murder. Kelly,
171 P3 d at 555-56.
5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008) (No. 07-
11073). Other victim impact evidence included testimony from a woman Kelly had raped
previously and testimony from the victim's mother about the impact of Sara's death on the
family. Kelly, 171 P3d at 556-57.
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1974-1993.6 Slow and melodic music began flowing immediately as Sara's
mother intermittently narrated the photos presented.'
One picture showed a young Sara as her mother's voice informed the
jurors that Sara was sitting up for the first time after having worn a frog-leg
splint for months.' Sara was also shown getting dressed for Halloween, a
holiday her mother explained was "very exciting" to her, and periodically
Sara's mother identified her age with respect to a particular photo.' The
video moved chronologically through Sara's life and jurors saw pictures and
heard about Sara learning to swim, playing the piano with her grandmother,
and spending time with her friends-.o
At one point, Sara's mother identified the soft, slow music as the
work of Enya, describing her as one of Sara's favorite artists and the type
of music she listened to frequently before her death." Throughout the
twenty-minute video, the jurors were exposed to important events and
special times in Sara's life, including video footage of her riding in a horse
competition and singing at school.' 2 The video concluded with a picture of
Sara's headstone and a video of men on horseback riding in the countryside
of southern Alberta, identified on the tape as the land of Sara's people
for many generations." While the jurors watched these last scenes, Sara's
mother described the meaning they had to her:
As time goes by, I try very hard not to think of Sara in terms of this terrible
crime that we've had to deal with here in the court, but rather think of her
in a place like this ... this is the kind of heaven she seems to belong in.'
The jury sentenced Kelly to death."
In 1991, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court explicitly approved
of the introduction of victim impact evidence'6 in the penalty phases of
capital trials." In its 6-3 decision, the Court held that a State might find
6 Videotape: Martha Farwell (1995), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2oo8/o8/kellyvideo.mpg.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
Io Id.
iI Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
'5 People v. Kelly, 171 P3d 548,552 (Cal. 2oo7), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct 564 (2008).
16 Victim impact evidence is not defined by BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY. A victim impact
statement is defined as "[a] statement read into the record during sentencing to inform the
judge or jury of the financial, physical, and psychological impact of the crime on the victim and
the victim's family." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1703 (9 th ed. 2oo9).
17 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 827 (1991) ("We thus hold that if the State chooses
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the evidence "relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed," and that as a matter of law victim impact
evidence should not be treated differently than other types of evidence."
The Court's decision in Payne, however, failed to articulate the range of
constitutionally permissible forms of victim impact evidence,1 9 and scholars
describe the standards for admissibility as vague,? unclear,' and varied."
As a result of the Court's lack of direction, lower courts have permitted
"wide-ranging evidence" regarding the victim's family and often do not
impose restrictions." Recent technological developments have prompted
a new type of victim impact evidence: the victim impact video, or video
montage.2 4 Although there is no legal definition of a victim impact video,
scholars have identified common characteristics these videos generally
share: a series of photos, often chronological and perhaps interspersed
with video, set to music, and displayed on either a courtroom screen or
television."
Challenges to victim impact evidence are grounded in a variety of forms,
including evidentiary and constitutional arguments. These challenges have
been met with mixed results, especially with respect to the scope and
content of video montages.2 6 Although Kelly appealed his conviction to
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence ... the Eighth Amendment erects no per
se bar.").
18 Id. at 827.
19 The Court did note that the evidence should relate to the "emotional impact of the
crimes on the victim's family." Id. at 817.
20 Christine M. Kennedy, Note, Victim Impact Videos: The New-Wave of Evidence in Capital
Sentencing Hearings, 26 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2oo8) ("The law governing the admis-
sibility of victim impact evidence is generally quite vague.").
21 Brian J. Johnson, Note, The Response to Payne v. Tennessee: Giving the Victim's Family
a Voice in the Capital Sentencing Process, 30 IND. L. REV. 795, 8oo 0 997) ("Despite Payne's hold-
ing, it did not provide state courts or legislatures with any clear guidelines of its application
to existing statutes.").
22 See Joe Frankel, Comment, Payne, Victim Impact Statements, and Nearly Two Decades
of Devolving Standards of Decency, 12 N.Y. Crry L. REV. 87, 107-08 (2oo8) ("What constitutes
victim impact evidence varies between jurisdictions because Payne does not mandate that
states adopt victim impact statutes, nor does it provide guidance to the type of statutes states
should adopt.").
23 John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL
L. Rev. 257, 270 (2003). The author cites several examples of the extreme content this type of
evidence can contain. For instance, with respect to the victim's family, courts have permitted
a victim's sister to testify that her marriage failed as a result of the murder and relatives have
been allowed to testify about miscarriages, heart attacks, and other illnesses. Id. at 270-71.
Some courts even allow testimony by friends, co-workers, distant relatives, and neighbors
concerning the impact of the victim's death on their life and/or community. See id.
24 For the purposes of this Note, the terms will be used interchangeably.
25 See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1078; see also Frankel, supra note 22, at iii (describing
"archived" video footage of statements made by the deceased instead of his family).
26 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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the Supreme Court in 2008, the Court denied certiorari over the dissents of
Justices Stevens and Breyer.2 ' Because a denial of certiorari in and of itself
contains no precedential value, one cannot read the Court's decision as
an approval of the form or content of the video entered against Kelly. As
technology improves, these types of issues will appear more frequently,
and this Note contends that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
in a victim impact video case not only to provide clarification to lower
courts on the forms of appropriate victim impact evidence but also to
determine the limits of the content.29 This Note advocates for the adoption
of a bright-line rule against video montages as victim impact evidence in
capital punishment sentencing trials because victim impact videos result
in fundamentally unfair trials, are outside the scope of the Court's holding
in Payne, and are irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403.
Part I of this Note examines the development of victim impact evidence.
Specifically, this section provides an overview of Booth v. Maryland3 0 South
Carolina v. Gathers,3 1 and Payne v. Tennessee." Part II briefly discusses the
different forms victim impact evidence takes, looking specifically at video
montages. This section also provides an overview of caselaw where victim
impact videos were admitted or denied and discusses the courts' reasoning
behind the decisions in light of factors significant to videos. Part III lays out
some of the evidentiary and constitutional challenges against victim impact
evidence generally. This section also targets the challenges specifically to
video montages. Part IV demonstrates how a bright-line rule barring video
montages is the best solution to preventing fundamentally unfair trials and
solving the lower courts' inconsistent applications of Payne.This Part further
argues that a bright-line rule is necessary due to the irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial nature of the evidence and the impermissible arbitrariness it
introduces into the capital sentencing process.
27 Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 564,567 (2oo8).
28 See Maryland v. Bait. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("[All that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously
insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views
on the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and again;
again and again the admonition has to be repeated.").
29 Some states allow for the introduction of victim impact evidence at non-capital trials.
These proceedings exceed the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
30 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
31 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
32 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8 (199i).
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
Historically, victim impact evidence was not admissible evidence at
capital sentencing hearings. Within a four-year span, the Supreme Court
twice rejected various forms of victim impact evidence before finally
recognizing it as constitutionally permissible. The following section details
the Supreme Court's treatment of victim impact evidence.
A. Booth v. Maryland
John Booth was sentenced to death afterajury found him guiltyof robbing
and murdering Irvin and Rose Bronstein." In accordance with a Maryland
statute, the presentence report contained victim impact statements
describing the effect of the crime on the victim's family.34 The statements
contained within the report were gathered through interviews with family
members, and the comments alluded to both personal characteristics
of the victims and explanations of how their deaths affected the family
members." The report concluded that the murders were "a shocking,
painful, and devastating memory" that "permeate[d] every aspect" of the
surviving family members' lives.36 Over defense counsel's objections, the
Maryland trial court admitted the victim impact statements as part of the
relevant evidence the jury could use in its sentencing decision." Booth was
33 Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98, 501.
34 Id. at 498. The Maryland state statute required a victim impact statement in all felony
cases to contain the following elements:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense; (ii) Itemize any economic loss
suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; (iii) Identify any physi-
cal injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along with its
seriousness and permanence; (iv) Describe any change in the victim's
personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense; (v)
Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or
the victim's family as a result of the offense; and (vi) Contain any other
information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or the
victim's family that the trial court requires.
Id. at 498-99 (citation omitted).
35 Id. at 499. The victims' son stated that he "suffer[ed] from lack of sleep and depres-
sion, and [wals 'fearful for the first time in his life."' Id. at 500. He also stated that he believed
his parents had been "'butchered like animals."' Id. The victims' daughter stated that she was
no longer able to "watch violent movies or look at kitchen knives without being reminded of
the murders." Id. The granddaughter stated that another family member's wedding had been
ruined as a result of the murders and that the family member was unable to go on her honey-
moon so she could attend the victims' funeral. Id. at 500.
36 Id. at 500.
37 Id. at soo-o. However, the prosecution stipulated to simply having the statements
read aloud instead of calling the family members to testify live. Id. at 501.
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sentenced to death for the murder of Mr. Bronstein and life imprisonment
for the death of Mrs. Bronstein." On automatic appeal, the Maryland Court
of Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences. 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited a capital sentencing jury from
considering victim impact evidence. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed
Booth's capital sentence and remanded to the Maryland Court of Appeals."
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell identified two types of information
the victim impact statement encompassed: first, unique character traits of
the victims as well as the impact of the crimes on the surviving family
members, and second, surviving family members' opinions of the crime.4 1
In the eyes of the majority, both types of evidence were "irrelevant" and
their admission created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury
may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner."42
With respect to the first type of evidence, the character traits of the
victims and the murder's emotional impact on family members, Powell
reasoned that defendants often do not know their victims and thus will
have no specific knowledge of the victim's characteristics. 43 Furthermore,
most killers do not select their victims based on potential secondary effects
on surviving family members." According to the Court, the jury could
wrongfully attribute knowledge of the victim's characteristics as part of the
defendant's decision to kill, thus distracting the jury from the "defendant's
background and record, and the circumstances of the crime.""s The majority
also raised the problem of rebuttal. Because of its nature, victim impact
evidence itself is not easily rebutted.46 Even if the defendant could rebut
the victim impact evidence introduced, the evidence the defendant might
use as rebuttal evidence concerning the victim's character, popularity, or
familial relationships would result in an impermissible "'mini-trial' of the
victim. 47
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 496,509.
41 Id. at 502.
42 Id. at 502-03.
43 Id. at 504.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 505. The Court has held that "a jury must make an 'individualized determina-
tion' whether the defendant in question should be executed, based on 'the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime."' Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862,879(1983)).
46 Id. at 5o6-07. ("Presumably the defendant would have the right to cross-examine the
declarants, but he rarely would be able to show that the family members have exaggerated the
degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered.").
47 Id. at 507.
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The second type of evidence contained within the report, the victim's
family members' opinions of the crime, was problematic because it only
inflamed the jury and diverted its attention from the crime's relevant
evidence and the defendant.48 Because capital sentencing decisions
require reasoned decision-making, the evidence was inconsistent with the
jury's ability to perform its duties.4 9 Recognizing that death is a unique
punishment, the Court concluded that the introduction of the victim impact
statements at Booth's sentencing trial violated the Eighth Amendment.s0
B. South Carolina v. Gathers
Two years after its decision in Booth, the Court considered a third type of
victim impact evidence: prosecutorial argument on personal characteristics
of the victim inferred from the victim's possessions.' Gathers was
sentenced to death for the murder of Richard Haynes, a stranger he met in
the park." Haynes possessed no formal religious training, but "considered
himself a preacher, referring to himself as 'Reverend Minister."' The
religious paraphernalia discovered at the crime scene" was introduced
during the guilt phase of the trial without objection and during sentencing
the prosecution did not submit new evidence." During closing arguments
at the trial's sentencing phase, however, the prosecutor spoke extensively
about the content of Haynes' religious items, in particular "'The Game
Guy's Prayer"' tract. 6 The prosecutor also commented at length about
Haynes's character, informing his rhetoric solely from the presence of the
religious items found on Haynes."
48 Id. at 508.
49 Id. at 508-09 ("[A]ny decision to impose the death sentence must'be, and appear to
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."' (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
358 (1977) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion))).
50 Id. at 5o9 n.i2 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976)
(plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
51 See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,805 (1989).
52 Id. at 806-07.
53 Id. at 807.
54 Haynes usually carried several bags with him containing religiously significant ar-
ticles. This included "two Bibles, rosary beads, plastic statues, olive oil, and religious tracts.
Among these items, on the evening of his murder, was a tract entitled 'The Game Guy's
Prayer,'... extoll[ing] the virtues of the good sport." Id.
55 Id. at 807-o8.
56 Id. at8o8-io.
57 Id. One notable passage is as follows:
You will find some other exhibits in this case that tell you more
about a just verdict. Again this is not easy. No one takes any pleasure
from it, but the proof cries out from the grave in this case. Among the
personal effects that this defendant could care little about when he went
20IO-20II 851
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed Gathers's
death sentence on grounds that the prosecutor's remarks "'conveyed the
suggestion [that Gathers] deserved a death sentence because the victim
was a religious man and a registered voter."' Writing for a 5-4 majority
of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan affirmed South Carolina's reversal,
holding that the prosecutor's argument went beyond the limits of the
evidence's relevancy and that the content of the religious items were
especially irrelevant given the lack of evidence that the defendant had
actually read the materials." Thus, because the content did not directly
relate to the circumstances of the crime, the statements were irrelevant and
thus inadmissible.0
C. Payne v. Tennessee
The Supreme Court was again presented with the issue of victim
impact evidence in Payne v. Tennessee, just four years after its decision
in Booth and only two years after its decision in Gathers. Pervis Tyrone
Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for murdering
a mother and her daughter and was sentenced to death for both.6 1 At the
sentencing phase of his trial, the victims' mother/grandmother testified
that her surviving grandson did not understand why his mother and sister
did not come home and that he cried for both.6z The prosecutor also spoke
at length in his closing argument about the surviving child's experience,
encouraging the jurors to sentence Payne to death to help vindicate the
through it is something that we all treasure. Speaks a lot about Rever-
end Minister Haynes. Very simple yet very profound. Voting. A voter's
registration card.
Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He took part. And
he believed that in Charleston County, in the United States of America,
that in this country you could go to a public park and sit on a public
bench and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius Gathers.
Id. at 809-io.
58 Id. at 8io (quoting State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988)).
59 Id. at 805, 81-12. ("The testimony at trial was that Gathers went through Haynes's
bags very quickly, 'just throwing [his belongings] everywhere, looking through things,' and
that he spent not more than a minute doing so." (citation omitted)).
6o Id.at8I2.
61 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 81i (1991). Payne was also convicted of one count
of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree for his attack on the victims' son/
brother and received an additional sentence of thirty years in prison for this offense. Id.
62 Id. at 814-15. ("'He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't
come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week
and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried
about my Lacie."').
852 [Vol. 99
2010-2011 DRAWING THE LINE AT PUSHING "PLAY"
loss of his mother and sister.63 In rebuttal to Payne's closing argument,
the prosecutor again directed the jury's attention to the victims and the
"'especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious ... burden"' of loss the son would
have to carry with him "'forever.'""
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to revisit its holdings in Booth and
Gathers that the Eighth Amendment erects a per se bar to victim impact
evidence.6 1 Writing for a 6-3 Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist overruled
Booth and Gathers and held that the Eighth Amendment did not, as a matter
of law, prohibit the jury from considering evidence concerning the victim
and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family members.6
The Court noted that its prior rulings reflected an attitude that the only
evidence relevant to a capital sentencing decision is that of the defendant's
"'blameworthiness,"' and it clarified that an "assessment of [the] harm
caused by the defendant" is an important concern for determinations of
both guilt and sentencing.7 The Court determined that the concern first
raised in Booth over a "'mini-trial"' of the victim's character was somewhat
inconsequential because the evidence often comes out during the guilt
phase anyway.68 Justice Rehnquist also analyzed the purpose of the
evidence, finding that it was not introduced to show that one killer deserves
the death penalty over another, but to show "each victim's 'uniqueness as
an individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to
the community resulting from his death might be."16 Finally, the Court
noted the "'traditional latitude"' states have in determining how to punish
murderers. 0
In light of this reasoning, the Court concluded that states could allow
juries to consider the harm caused by the defendant in their sentencing
decisions." In Payne, Rehnquist found the testimony was not related to the
63 See id. at 815.
64 Id. at 816.
65 Id. at 816-17. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that although the grandmother's
testimony might be 'technically irrelevant,"' its admission "'did not create a constitutionally
unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Id. (quoting State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d io, 18 (Tenn. 1990)).
66 Id. at 827.
67 Id. at 819. Rehnquist noted that the principles underlying sentencing have varied
over time, but that discretionary punishments do factor in the degree of harm caused by the
defendant. Id. at 82o (citing STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SIrrING IN JUDGMENT: ThE SENTENCING
or WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988)).
68 Id. at 823.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 824 (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990)).
71 Id. at 825 ("By turning the victim into a 'faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a
capital trial,' Booth deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent
the jury from having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper punish-
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brutal nature of Payne's crimes, and it only served to illustrate the lasting,
harmful effects of the murders." Although acknowledging the role of stare
decisis, the Court nevertheless held that its prior decisions were decided
on narrow margins over "spirited dissents," and that the rulings had been
questioned by later decisions and "ha[d] defied consistent application by
the lower courts."73
II. VIDEO MONTAGES AS VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
A. Breaking Down the Video
Although victim impact videos do not have an exact legal definition,
basic characteristics stand out as key factors in a court's analysis of the
admissibility of a particular video: length, type of photographs, music, and
availability of other types of victim impact evidence.74 Another (increasingly
important) factor is the presence of video feed."
According to Payne, the purpose of victim impact evidence is to "offer[]
'a quick glimpse of the life' that a defendant 'chose to extinguish."'7 6
Although courts frequently rely on this phrase in evaluating the admissibility
of particular victim impact evidence, judges are otherwise left to consider
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 and comparable state law to see if a
particular piece of evidence is admissible. 7 The following section seeks to
demonstrate how courts examine individual factors in their analyses.
ment for a first-degree murder." (citing South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
72 Id. at 826.
73 Id. at 828-30.
74 See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1o87 ("Courts appear to employ a multi-factor balanc-
ing test in which each element of the video length, number of photographs, and music, as
well as the other available evidence, are each but one factor to be considered in determining
admissibility as a whole.").
75 See Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564,567 (2008) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) ("Equally troubling is the form in which the evidence was presented.As these cases
demonstrate, when victim impact evidence is enhanced with music, photographs or video
footage, the risk of unfair prejudice quickly becomes overwhelming."); seealso People v. Kelly,
171 P.3d 548, 571-72 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2oo8) (discussing the relevancy
of the video feed of Alberta, Canada); People v. Prince, 156 P3d 1015, 1091-94 (Cal. 2007)
(discussing the characteristics of a video-taped interview of the victim introduced as victim
impact evidence).
76 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting)).
77 See Kennedy, supra note zo, at lo81-87.
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B. Breaking Down the Courts' Opinions78
1. People v. Bramit.-In People v. Bramit, the Supreme Court of California
considered three types of victim impact evidence admitted during
sentencing: testimony of the victim's family, a videotape, and testimony of
victims from an uncharged crime.79 The court easily disposed of defendant's
appeal on the testimony, finding that in both instances it was relevant and
admissible.80 The video at issue was an arrangement of less than twenty
still photographs of the victim, his family, and his home, most of which the
court found to be "snapshots of very poor quality.""' Noting the need for
caution in admitting videotapes," especially those of length," the court
concluded that it had admitted much longer videos, including the twenty-
minute video from the trial of People v. Kelly,' and that the tape's probative
value outweighed any. prejudicial impact potentially resulting from the
three-minute video.85
The court further noted that all of the video's photos had been admitted
as evidence during the guilt phase absent defendant's objection. Thus, the
court characterized the video as "merely ... evidence in a different medium,
unenhanced by any soundtrack or commentary." 6 Citing its own decision
in People v. Kelly, the court noted that the video served the underlying
purpose of victim impact evidence by "'humaniz[ing]' the victim.""
2. People v. Dykes.-The California Supreme Court again considered the
admissibility of a victim video in 2009. In People v. Dykes, Dykes appealed
his death sentence on seven grounds, one of which was the admissibility
of victim impact evidence including testimony of four individuals, still
78 The cases discussed are not the only cases involving victim impact video montages;
they are examples merely to demonstrate how the courts have treated the evidence.
79 People v. Bramit, 210 P.3d I171, i86-88 (Cal. 2009).
So Id. at i186-87.
8I Id. at i187.
82 Id. (citing People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564
(2oo8)).
83 Id. (citing People v. Prince, 156 P3d 1oi5, 1093 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. i o6
(2oo8)).
84 Id. (citing People v. Kelly, 171 P3d 548,570,572 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564
(2oo8) (admitting a twenty-minute video)); seealso People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 05, 137 (Cal.
2008), cer. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2oo8) (allowing the admission of a fourteen-minute video);
People v. Prince, 156 P3d Io15, iog, Io94 (Cal. 2007),cert. denied, 552 U.S. I lo6 (2o08) (allow-
ing the admission of a twenty-five minute video)).
85 Bramit, 21oP.3d at ii87.
86 Id.
87 Id. (citing People v. Kelly, 171 P3d 548, 570 (Cal. 2007), Cet. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564
(2oo8)).
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photographs, and a video." Dykes claimed that the prejudicial nature
of the evidence deprived him of due process, resulting in an arbitrarily
determined sentence. 9 Unsurprisingly, the court found no issues with the
admissibility of both the testimony and still photographs, dedicating the
weight of its analysis to the video.'
The eight-minute video depicted the victim and his family enjoying a
trip to Disneyland.91 Dykes argued that the video was inflammatory and
highly prejudicial because it showed a happy young child with his family,
thus going beyond Payne's contemplation of a "'quick glimpse."'92 At the
outset of its analysis, the court noted the lack of a bright-line rule regarding
the admissibility of video montages as victim impact evidence." Looking
to both Payne and its own decision in People v. Edwards" for guidance, the
court deemed the tape an "awkwardly shot 'home movie"' lacking the
elements generally designed to stir up emotions. 95 The court held that the
video was "entirely devoid of drama," only depicting "factual and . . . real
events."" Thus, the tape was admissible and did not result in an arbitrary
application of the death penalty.
3. State v. Leon.-In State v. Leon, the defendant challenged the admission
of a four-and-one-half-minute video as inadmissible under the Idaho
Constitution, claiming that it was not a "statement" and thus outside the
scope of the victims' rights as contemplated by the state. 97 The Idaho Court
88 People v. Dykes, 209 P3d I, 44-45 (Cal. 2009).
89 Id. at 44.
90 Id. at 45-47.
9' Id. at 47 ("The videotape began with a clip of Lance having climbed up a tree. It then
portrayed Lance spending time with family members. The tape included parts of the drive to
Southern California and displayed the family interacting in a hotel room. The videotape oc-
casionally focused on Lance, who often is smiling or making amusing gestures to the camera,
but it also included footage of other family members.").
9 2 Id.
93 Id. at 48.
94 Id. ("[T]he prosecution may 'not introduce irrelevant or inflammatory material' that
'diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective re-
sponse."' (quoting People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436,467 (Cal. 1991))).
95 Dykes, 209 P3d at 48 ("The videotape does not constitute a memorial, tribute, or
eulogy; it does not contain staged or contrived elements, music, visual techniques designed to
generate emotion, or background narration; it does not convey any sense of outrage or call for
vengeance or sympathy.
96 Id.
97' State v. Leon, 132 P3d 462, 464-65 (Idaho Ct. App. 2oo6). The Idaho Constitution
gives a crime victim the ability "[t]o be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceed-
ings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant, unless
manifest injustice would result." IDAHO CONsT. art 1, § 22, cl. 6. The IDAHO CODE provides
that if the crime is a homicide, the right extends to the victim's family. IDAHO CODE ANN. §
19-53o6(3) (2007).
856 [Vol. 99
DRAWING THE LINE AT PUSHING "PLAY"
of Appeals determined that a video qualifies as a means to be "heard" and
held that videos and photographs in and of themselves were admissible as
constitutional victim impact evidence." The court further stated, however,
that some videos or photos could be so inflammatory that "'manifest
injustice' would result from their admission."
The court upheld the admission of the video, finding that it showed
the victim with her family and conveyed personal characteristics of
the victim." Furthermore, the video showed, to some extent, the loss
suffered by the victim's surviving children who were too young to testify
or offer a statement to be read." The court found that the musical track
accompanying the video, although not a valid exercise of victims' rights
guaranteed under the Idaho constitution, did not inflame the jury or
amount to manifest injustice. 1 z The video's length also did not present an
obstacle to admission, meeting Payne's standard of a "'quick glimpse of the
life petitioner chose to extinguish."'10 Consequently, the video was upheld
as a valid exercise of the victim's constitutional rights."
4. UnitedStates v. Sampson.-In United States v. Sampson, the defendant was
sentenced to death under the Federal Death Penalty Act, as which allows
for the introduction of victim impact evidence in the form of testimony
or a statement identifying the victim and the loss to the victim's family. 06
The trial court, while cognizant of its responsibility to ensure that admitted
evidence is not unduly prejudicial and does not deny due process,to7
admitted the testimony of six witnesses but denied the admission of a
video memorial of one of the victims as victim impact evidence."0
98 Leon, 132 P3d at 466-67.
99 Id. at 467.
ioo Id.
iox Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 830 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
io4 Id.
1o5 United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 173-74 (D. Mass. 2004).
io6 Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2006).
107 Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 187. The court stated:
The first check is the trial court's statutory responsibility, see 18
U.S.C. § 3593(c), to decide if the probative value of a particular piece of
evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, in the form of
inflaming the jury's passions ....
The second check is the responsibility of the court to secure the
defendant's right to due process by viewing the proffered evidence in
the context of all other evidence in the case....
Id.
io8 Id. at 189, 191.
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The proposed video was nearly thirty minutes long, was set to "poignant
music," and was comprised of pictures showing the victim "with family,
friends and religious figures."'" The trial court found that even without
the music the video would have surpassed the "'quick glimpse"' standard
from Payne and would have inflamed the jury's passions. 0 The court noted
that the video, originally created for the victim's memorial service, was
"fitting and lovely for its original, intended purpose" but that it was not
constitutionally permissible victim,-impact evidence."'
5. Salazar v. State.-In Salazar v. State, the defendant challenged the
admission of a seventeen-minute video, consisting of 140 photos, arranged
chronologically, and set to the music of Enya and Celine Dion's "My Heart
Will Go On" from the movie Titanic."' Over half of the photos showed the
victim as an infant with other family members, and later photos showed the
victim as a young athlete with friends and a prom date. Furthermore, the
music was "keyed" to the video's pace and to particular photographs." The
trial court did not review the video prior to admitting it and also overruled
defendant's objection to review it prior to admission.114
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals characterized the
video as a "masterful portrait of a baby becoming a young man" and
"extraordinarily emotional.""I While recognizing the holding of Payne, the
court ultimately held that the sentencing phase of a criminal trial is not a
substitute for a memorial service and that victim impact evidence "may
become unfairly prejudicial through sheer volume."" 6 In weighing the
factors required for admission, the court found that the video's probative
value was very low as compared to a high risk of unfair prejudice:
Nearly half of the photographs showed Jonathon Bishop as an infant,
toddler or small child, but appellant murdered an adult, not a child. He
extinguished Jonathon Bishop's future, not his past. The probative value
of the vast majority of these "infant-growing-into-youth" photographs is de
minimis. However, their prejudicial effect is enormous because the implicit
suggestion is that appellant murdered this angelic infant; he killed this
laughing, light-hearted child; he snuffed out the life of the first-grade soccer
player and of the young boy hugging his blond puppy dog. The danger
of unconsciously misleading the jury is high. While the probative value of
1o9 Id. at 192.
no Id.
iii Id.at193n.12.
I12 Salazar v. State, go S.W.3d 330, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
113 Id. at 334.
114 Id. at333.
115 Id. at 334.
I16 Id. at 335-36 (quoting Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262-63 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998)).
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one or two photographs of an adult murder victim's childhood might not
be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, what the State
accurately characterizes as a "seventeen-minute montage" of the victim's
entire life is very prejudicial both because of its "sheer volume," and
because of its undue emphasis upon the adult victim's halcyon childhood."'
Although the court found the video inadmissible, it remanded the case
because the intermediate appellate court failed to apply the standard of
review correctly."' On remand, the court of appeals found that the video
constituted harmful error and vacated defendant's sentence for a new
sentencing hearing." 9
C. Overarching Caselaw Conclusions
The previous sections identified relevant factors in the judicial
determination of whether a particular video should be admitted as victim
impact evidence and provided specific examples of how courts apply those
factors to individual cases. From these examples, two general conclusions
can be drawn.
First, victim impact videos are usually admitted, and the video format
does not present a problem. Courts frequently cite to Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Payne and find that the video is a "quick glimpse" into
the life of the victim. Furthermore, the form of the evidence-the video
itself, as opposed to oral testimony or still photographs-does not present
a per se bar to its admission. Although the video in Sampson was ultimately
inadmissible, the court noted that several other courts had permitted the
admission of victim impact videos.zo In Leon, the Court.found no reason
to limit the introduction of video images or photographs as outside of the
victim's state constitutional rights to be heard because of their medium."'
Thus, although not a form of evidence contemplated by Payne, courts do
not find victim impact videos inadmissible solely because of their video
format.
Second, courts are generally very lenient in what forms the video can
take and how far into the life of the victim it can go. As evidenced above,
courts are willing to admit home movies and still photographs set to music
in a video form. In Kelly, a seemingly extreme case, the video admitted
was nearly twenty minutes long, set to soft music, and included video
117 Id.at337.
118 Id. at339.
i19 Salazar v. State, I18 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. App. 2003).
120 United States v. Sampson, 335 E Supp. 2d 166, 191-92; see also People v. Prince, 156
P.3d 1015, 1092 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. ilo6 (zoo8) (noting the admission of videos
in other courts).
121 State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462,466-67 (Idaho Ct.App. 2oo6).
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feed and narration by the victim's mother.' Furthermore, several courts
have upheld the admission of videos that were not montages, but rather
interviews or documentaries of the victim.' Although courts frequently
note the need for caution in permitting videos to serve as victim impact
evidence,12 4 videos are rarely deemed inadmissible.
III. CHALLENGING VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
The following section provides a brief overview of challenges commonly
made against victim impact evidence. This section provides the arguments
behind the basic challenges, tailored specifically to victim impact videos,
and seeks to demonstrate why victim impact videos are usually admitted.
Because courts fail to give defendants' challenges against these videos
sufficient consideration, however, the final section of this Note advocates
for the adoption of a bright-line rule.
A. Due Process
On appeal, defendants can challenge admitted victim impact evidence
as violating their right to due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment."' In their concurrences in Payne, Justices O'Connor and
Souter noted the applicability of the Due Process Clause to victim impact
evidence. Justice O'Connor focused on the potentially infectious nature of
particular testimony or evidence to render the sentencing decision unfair 2 6
122 See People v. Kelly, 171 P3d 548, 570 (Cal. 2007). While a longer video, also set to
moving music, was excluded in Sampson, it was not created for trial, but for the victim's memo-
rial service. See Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 193 n.12.
123 See United States v. Wilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 491, 505 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (admitting a
twenty-minute video of the victim answering questions about his job as an undercover detec-
tive); People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1oi5, 1o91 (Cal. 2007) (admitting a twenty-five minute video
interview with the victim).
124 See Prince, 156 P.3d at 1093 ("Courts must exercise great caution in permitting the
prosecution to present victim-impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed
tribute to the victim. Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or empha-
sizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium itself
may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might
experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or listening to the victim's bereaved
parents."); see also Kelly, 171 P 3 d at 57 1 ("Trial courts must be very cautious about admitting
[victim impact] videotape evidence.").
125 For a discussion about how due process should be applied, see Jonathan H. Levy,
Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 SrAN. L. REV.
t027, 1030-37 (1993) (arguing for a two-prong due process standard to be applied to victim
impact evidence cases).
126 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If, in a par-
ticular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding
as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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while Justice Souter opined of "the 'duty to search for constitutional
error with painstaking care,' an obligation 'never more exacting than it is
in a capital case.""" When appealing, defendants often emphasize the
"limited probative value" of the evidence as contrasted with the "highly
emotional and often inflammatory evidence."' Evidence seeking to prove
the "unique" characteristics of the victim (e.g., race, religion, class, wealth,
education, social status, etc.) can create situations where the jury makes its
sentencing decision based on "improper factors." 2 9
Victim impact videos present strong cases for due process challenges.
Without specific guidance on the appropriate limits for video montages,
courts are forced to make individual decisions regarding the acceptability of
a particular video, and these ad hoc determinations lead to inconsistencies
as many arguably irrelevant and inflammatory videos are admitted. While
the videos might have enough probative value under Payne to make them
relevant, the videos are often lengthy and set to emotionally charged
music and frequently contain photos and video feed that tug at jurors'
heartstrings. 3 0 The compelling emotions that these videos evoke can lead
to fundamentally unfair sentencing proceedings, resulting in violations of
the defendant's right to due process. Due process challenges, however, are
rarely successful. The defendant's due process challenge failed in Dykes,
and in Kelly, the court determined that any due process "error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Thus, despite its potential, a due process
challenge of a victim impact video montage appears to be a weak argument
for a defendant's appeal because courts ignore the enormous emotionally
prejudicial impact these videos present.
127 Payne, 5oi U.S. at 837 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,
785 (1987)).
128 Ellen Kreitzberg, Capital Cases, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 31, 34.
129 Id. ("[W]hen the jury hears this information they become more likely to base their
decision to impose death on improper factors; an emotional response to the family images, a
tendency to identify with the similarity between themselves and the victim, or by making a
comparative judgment between the victim and the defendant.").
130 See supra Part II.B; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 14
("Choreographed video-tributes to victims, drawing upon cinematic techniques designed
specifically to play on the audience's emotions, inject unduly inflammatory evidence into
what is to be a 'reasoned, moral' determination of whether the defendant is to be executed
and thus create an unconstitutional risk of arbitrary capital sentencing in violation of the
Eighth Amendment." (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))).
131 People v. Kelly, 171 P3d 548,572 (Cal. 2007) (citing People v. Gonzalez, 135 P 3 d 649
(Cal. 2oo6)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2oo8).
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B. Eighth Amendment
After being sentenced to death, defendants can also challenge the
admission of victim impact evidence as resulting in an arbitrary and
capricious application of the death penalty. Paynedid not provide prosecutors
with an automatic right to introduce victim impact evidence; instead, the
Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not draw a per se bar to its
admission."' Therefore, the Court left open the possibility for an Eighth
Amendment violation."' Such an appeal is based on how jurors' emotional
reactions to the video precluded them from meaningfully considering the
individual characteristics of the defendant when deciding his sentence.1 4
In Peoplev. Prince, the California Supreme Court stated that if a trial court
admits a video montage, it "must monitor the jurors' reactions to ensure
that the proceedings do not become injected with a legally impermissible
level of emotion.""' How much emotion is appropriate in the courtroom
has received considerable scholarly attention in recent years,1 6 but the
standard for victim impact evidence set by the Court in Payne controls: a
verdict must be based on deliberation, not inflamed passion."' While one
scholar has deemed all victim impact evidence inherently emotional,13 8 a
video montage is arguably more emotionally charged than oral testimony,
written statements, or still photographs. Melodic music, the human
interaction displayed in video feed, and voice-over narration accompanying
the photographs contribute collectively to .the emotional response of
jurors. These factors are compounded in lengthier videos and serve only to
intensify an "excessively emotional" decision making process. 3 9
Recent studies, including mock juror studies and one study looking
at actual jury sentencing patterns in California, demonstrate that victim
impact statements have "an overall small but consistent effect . . . in
increasing the likelihood of death sentences."" Thus, even though
132 Payne, So U.S. at 827.
133 Kreitzberg, supra note 128, at 35.
134 Id.
135 People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015, 1093 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. ilo6 (2oo8).
136 See Kennedysupra note 20, at 8o94-98 (discussing the rise in scholarship of emotion
in the legal setting).
137 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring).
138 See Frankel, supra note 22, at I20.
139 Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1o99.
140 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting and Capital Sentencing: Reducing the Effect
of Victim Impact Statements, 46 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 1 IO (2oo9); see also James Luginbuhl &
Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial: Encouraging Votes for Death, 2o AM.
J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 9 (1995) (finding that roughly half of mock jurors presented with victim im-
pact evidence voted to sentence the defendant to death compared to the twenty percent who
did not read the victim impact statements and voted for death). But see Brooke Butler, The Role
of Death Qualification in Venirepersons' Susceptibility to Victim Impact Statements, PSYcHOL. CRIM.
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jurors may not visibly react in an emotional way, studies show that they
are psychologically influenced by victim impact evidence. Presenting this
evidence in video form compounds the problem by allowing jurors to relate
more intimately to the victim and his or her emotions.141 Furthermore,
when musical accompaniment is added, the effect of the visual images
is exacerbated; particular songs can arouse emotional memories in jurors
to the detriment of their rational decision-making capability. 142 All of this
suggests that courts should, at a minimum, very closely analyze the video
for emotional effect and, if admitted, monitor jurors' reactions.
Courts routinely reject Eighth Amendment challenges, however. In
Prince, the court noted that jurors were visibly sad during the viewing of
the video, but that their responses were not emotionally heightened as
compared to the oral testimony from the victims' families.143 Finding a lack
of crying or any appearance of jurors being emotionally overwrought, the
court denied the defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge.'" By focusing
solely on the absence of outward displays of emotion, courts ignore the
significant research indicating that jurors are emotionally impacted by
victim impact evidence, thus increasing the likelihood of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Despite the demonstrated emotional effect on
jurors, a video montage appeal based on juror arbitrariness is unlikely to
be successful.
C. Balancing Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403
For evidence to be admissible, the Federal Rules of Evidence require
that proffered evidence be (1) relevant 45 and (2) not present a risk of
undue prejudice. 1" Relevance, defined as "having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
& L., April 2008, at 133, 140 (finding that victim impact evidence has no significant effect on
juror sentencing); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence
in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 306, 341(2003) (arguing a lack of effect
of victim impact evidence); Mila Green McGowan & Bryan Myers, Who is the Victim Anyway?
The Effects of Bystander Victim Impact Statements on Mock Juror Sentencing Decisions, 19 VIOLENCE
& VICTIMS 357, 368 (2004) (reporting no effect on sentencing decisions when comparing by-
stander victim impact statements with "typical" victim impact statements).
141 See Kennedy, supra note 20, at I ioo-oi ("[Tihey feel as though they are a part of the
action with the victim, and thus they share the emotion of the persons on the screen; they feel
the happiness from these life experiences and, therefore, sadness for the victim, who has lost
forever the chance to experience such things.").
142 Id. at 101-03.
143 People v. Prince, 156 P3d 1015, 1094 (Cal. 2007), cerr. denied, 552 U.S. iio6 (2oo8).
144 Id.
145 FED. R. EVID. 401.
146 FED. R. EVID. 403.
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evidence," is a very low standard and favors admission of evidence. 147
Admission is not automatic, however, as judges must balance the evidence's
probative value against the risk of "unfair prejudice" and exclude the
evidence if the relevance is "substantially outweighed by the danger."1 48
1. Relevance.-Justice Stevens's strong dissent in Payne focused significantly
on the irrelevancy of victim impact evidence to the capital sentencing
decision. Citing prior decisions of the Court that the relevancy of evidence
at a capital punishment sentencing must have "some bearing on the
defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt," Stevens argued that
if the evidence presented served only to demonstrate a victim's personal
characteristics or to show how the crime impacted the victim's family,
it was necessarily irrelevant.'49 Thus, if the evidence presents details
unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of the crime, it is irrelevant
because it fails to show the defendant's culpability for that particular
crime.s0
Arguing that the Court lacked precedent for its decision, Stevens opined
that victim impact evidence served no purpose but "to encourage jurors
to decide in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions
rather than their reason."'"' Accusing the majority of forsaking the rules of
evidence and "ventur[ing] into uncharted seas of irrelevance,"' Stevens
147 See FED. R. EviD. 401.
148 FED. R. EVID. 403.
149 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 857 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 8o (1982)).
150 Id. at 861-62. Justice Stevens wrote:
The majority attempts to justify the admission of victim impact evi-
dence by arguing that "consideration of the harm caused by the crime
has been an important factor in the exercise of [sentencing] discretion."
This statement is misleading and inaccurate. It is misleading because
it is not limited to harm that is foreseeable. It is inaccurate because it
fails to differentiate between legislative determinations and judicial
sentencing. It is true that an evaluation of the harm caused by different
kinds of wrongful conduct is a critical aspect in legislative definitions of
offenses and determinations concerning sentencing guidelines. There
is a rational correlation between moral culpability and the foreseeable
harm caused by criminal conduct. Moreover, in the capital sentencing
area, legislative identification of the special aggravating factors that may
justify the imposition of the death penalty is entirely appropriate. But
the majority cites no authority for the suggestion that unforeseeable and
indirect harms to a victim's family are properly considered as aggravating
evidence on a case-by-case basis.
Id. (citation omitted).
151 Id. at 856.
152 Id. at 859.
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foresaw what the empirical data discussed above demonstrates: arbitrary
sentences result from otherwise inadmissible and irrelevant evidence.15 3
2. Unduly Prejudicial.-None of the videos in the cases detailed above
contained any component bearing on the guilt of the individual defendant;
they were moving tributes created to show the life of the victim. Thus,
when the Court overruled its decisions in Booth and Gathers, it changed
its standard of relevancy in capital sentencing cases and increased the
importance of the required balancing test for undue prejudice. Although
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the evidence was irrelevant, thus
eliminating the need for balancing the evidence's probative value against
the risk of undue prejudice, the Court's holding that the evidence was
relevant triggered the balancing test.
The Court in Payne recognized the potential for the evidence to
result in an unfair trial and even conceded that the evidence in Payne was
potentially unfair.ss4 Nevertheless, the Court found that the sentencing
party could simultaneously consider the crime's harm along with the
defendant's mitigating evidence.'s Payne, however, did not contemplate
victim impact evidence videos; the evidence before the Court was limited
to testimony from family members and arguments from the prosecution.1 s6
Victim impact videos, because of the characteristics discussed above,
present a significantly higher risk of prejudice.' 7 They are uninterrupted
presentations of evidence frequently accompanied by emotionally charged
music and video effects that only serve to create an emotionally charged
atmosphere for the jury's sentencing deliberations. The unique nature
of this type of evidence creates a substantial risk of undue prejudice in
violation of Rule 403.
3. Relevance and Prejudice Conclusions.-Defendants' relevancy challenges
are often losing arguments. In Prince, the court considered the relevancy of
the evidence in tandem with its potential inflammatory nature and failed
to make meaningful findings with regard to relevancy, focusing solely on
the "neutral" and "polite" nature of the interview.15 8 In Dykes, the court
153 See id. at 866 ("We should be concerned instead with the cases in which it will make
a difference. In those cases, defendants will be sentenced arbitrarily to death on the basis of
evidence that would not otherwise be admissible because it is irrelevant to the defendants'
moral culpability. The Constitution's proscription against the arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty must necessarily proscribe the admission of evidence that serves no purpose other
than to result in such arbitrary sentences.").
154 Id. at 825 (majority opinion).
155 Id. at 826.
156 See id.
157 See supra Part II.B.
158 People v. Prince, 156 P3d 10i5, 1093 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. i1o6 (2008).
The court did state that "[i]f not for the circumstances of her subsequent murder," the video
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considered relevancy extensively, eventually finding the video relevant by
serving to demonstrate "each victim's uniqueness as an individual human
being" and by allowing the jury insight into the losses suffered by the
victim's family.' 9 The court in Kelly also considered the relevance of the
admitted video and found it highly relevant to the jury's decision. The
video allowed the jury to see the victim's "fresh-face[] ... before she died"
and provided jurors with an insight into the victim's demeanor, "something
words alone could not capture."1so Furthermore, by allowing jurors to
observe the victim's life vis-A-vis the video, jurors knew the victim better
than before and thus could have "reasonably ... and relevantly" concluded
that the defendant could have preyed on the victim's vulnerabilities to
commit the crime.' 6'
The rulings in Prince, Dykes, and Kelly go beyond Payne's relevancy
rationale as a way to inform the jury about the harm the defendant's crime
caused. 6 By admitting videos detailing the chronology of the victim's life
and the specific nature of the victim's talents, adventures, and, in some
cases, aspirations, courts are permitting jurors to befriend the victim in
emotionally charged ways. This type of knowledge does not necessarily
translate into juror's knowledge regarding harm the crime has caused the
victim's family. Payne also mandated that victim impact evidence is only
meant to capture a brief glimpse of the victim's uniqueness,16 arguably
implying that evidence going beyond this standard impermissibly allows
the jury to assess the "worthiness of the victim," not the "blameworthiness
of the defendant."'4 Because courts are willing to uphold the admission of
videos like the one in Kelly where, on review, parts of the video montage
were found to be of questionable relevance, 6 s relevancy has been stretched
to its extreme and fails to provide defendants with a meaningful method of
appeal for the admission of a video montage at capital sentencing.
would have little interest to most outside of the victim's immediate family. Id. While this is
arguably a finding of relevance, it fails to specifically identify how the video and its content are
particularly relevant to the case especially in light of the court's characterization of the video.
159 People v. Dykes, 209 P 3 d 1, 45-46 (Cal. 2oo9) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
i6o People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571 (Cal. 2oo7).
I6I Id.
162 See Payne v. Tennessee, 5o U.S. 8o8, 825 (1991).
163 See Vesna Jaksic, Victim Impact Videos Raise Fairness Issue: Defense Lawyers Say Pre-
sentations Stir Jurors' Emotions, Spur Stifer Penalties; High Court Declines to Hear Issue, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Dec. 29, zoo8, availableat 2oo8 WLNR 271o8915 (The article quotes
senior deputy state public defender Evan Young as stating: "These life chronologies-they
really extend from birth to death and are quite extensive. That really goes quite beyond what
we believe Payne ever envisioned."); see also Payne, 5o U.S. at 823.
164 Kreitzberg, supra note 128, at 32.
165 Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571 ("In some respects, the videotape here might have contained
irrelevant aspects.").
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D. Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment allows criminal defendants the right to confront
the witnesses against them,' and because the capital sentencing phase is
an extension of the guilt phase, defendants possess many of the same rights
during the sentencing phase, including the right to confront witnesses. 67 By
arguing that a video serves as proof of the dreams, desires, and life goals that
the victim would have sought to meet through his or her life's path, a video
is being offered for the truth of the matter asserted-this is the embodiment
of the victim's goals. Thus, a video of this type is hearsay.'6 Furthermore,
assuming a victim impact video would be considered testimonial under
Crawfordv. United States, it would violate the Confrontation Clause.'69
The defendant in Prince argued prior to the video's admission and on
appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the
admission of the video against him.' The trial court held that the video
did not qualify as hearsay because the video merely showed the victim's
demeanor."' Furthermore, the video was not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted because the tape's content was "'secondary"'; much of the
information revealed in the tape had already been introduced during the
guilt phase."' On appeal, the California Supreme Court upheld the ruling
that the video was non-hearsay because any information contained within
was additional to the information introduced through testimony in the guilt
phase where the defendant had opportunity for cross-examination."'
Although the video in Prince was found not to contain extraneous
information, videos set to music and containing detailed chronologies of
the victim's life will likely contain information not previously introduced at
trial. Thus, the video serves only to inflame the passions of the jury and goes
beyond a "brief glimpse" into the victim's life. A ruling that a victim impact
video violates a defendant's right to confrontation would be consistent
with the consensus of the lower courts that the Confrontation Clause
does not bar victim impact testimony when it is used only in the capital
sentencing decision.'74 Lower courts have only ruled the Confrontation
166 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
167 Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (i98i).
168 Kreitzberg, supra note i28, at 59-60. The argument for hearsay is that the relevancy
of the video is based on its truth. Id. at 6o.
169 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (listing "pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially" as an example of testimonial
evidence).
170 People v. Prince, 156 P-3d 1oi5, io9 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. io6 (2oo8).
171 Id. at lo94-
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3 d 561, 584 (Mo. 2009); United States v. Fields, 483
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Clause inapplicable to victim impact statements and testimony, and they
have not directly addressed whether the Clause applies to videos. Unlike
oral testimony or a written statement, however, a victim impact video is an
artistic creation imbued with emotion and personal touches. There is no
effective way to confront the video or its creator.'
In contrast, the "day-in-the-life" documentaries used in civil cases may
be more amenable to cross-examination because the subject of the video
is alive. In Employers Mutual Liabilily Insurance Co. v. H. C. Mason Associates,
an Alaskan district court admitted a silent, twenty-five minute video of
the plaintiff performing daily and other activities."1 6 The court overruled
the defendant's hearsay objection, but distinguished between non-hearsay
videos and hearsay videos."' Finding that the "general conclusion is that
motion pictures are not hearsay and are admissible if subject to cross-
examination," the court also found that a "film offered by the plaintiff
showing the plaintiff performing tasks to exhibit his disability is like a
witness testifying about assertive conduct.""' Because the film at issue
fell into the latter category, it was ruled hearsay.17 9 Nevertheless, the court
admitted the video under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24),so the residual
or "catchall" exception. The court reasoned that the plaintiff-actor and the
verifying witness's cross-examinations would guarantee truthfulness, and
also required that the video be revealed sufficiently in advance of trial to
prevent unfair surprise.' 1 In a capital sentencing hearing, however, the
victim cannot testify as to the truthfulness or sincerity of the video montage.
There is, essentially, no one to "confront"; this is very different from the
living plaintiff in a civil case who is available for cross-examination on the
contents of a video. Thus, while the residual clause may save videos in civil
cases, it should not be invoked to stretch the limits of criminal evidence.
E. Equal Protection
Victim impact videos create the potential for jurors to draw inappropriate
conclusions about the values of the victim's and the defendant's life and
F3d 313,326 (5th Cir. 2007).
175 Victim impact videos are distinguishable from the permissible use of one-way closed
circuit television testimony. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), child-abuse victim-
witnesses were permitted to testify via one-way circuit television to prevent the trauma of
testifying in the courtroom. Id. at 841-42. The public policy reasons of preventing trauma to
the child do not apply in capital sentencing hearings.
176 Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. H. C. Mason Assocs., 73 F.R.D. 607,609, 612 (D. Alaska
1977).
177 Id. at6to-ii.
178 Id.
179 Id. at6II.
i8o Id.
i8I Id.
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worth. In Payne, the Supreme Court affirmed that victim impact evidence
should not permit the jury to engage in comparative worth analysis.' Victim
impact evidence, however, arguably creates two classes of defendants and
victims.' With respect to defendants, the evidence can imply that some
defendants kill worthier members of society than other defendants.'" The
evidence can also create victim classes, dividing the line between those
victims whose lives were so worthwhile that their death should be avenged
by killing the defendant and those victims whose lives were not worthy
enough for the death penalty to be imposed.' Thus, when elaborate
videos like the one in Kelly are introduced, jurors will be more inclined
to make comparative worth judgments because their attention will be
inappropriately focused on the "victim's race, education, economic status,
religion, and ethnicity."'16 These types of judgments are compounded by
the natural human tendency of jurors to relate more closely to and feel
more empathy for victims like themselves, potentially resulting in blatant
discrimination. 8 7
In Leon, the defendant challenged the video's admission as a "'manifest
injustice"' under the state statute and therefore inadmissible against
him.' The defendant argued that a picture of the victim's children at
the gravesite was "particularly damning and prejudicial," but the court
found that smiling, happy children could not have inflamed the jury's
passion beyond rational decision making capabilities. 1 9 The court's ruling,
however, arguably overlooked a natural tendency of jurors to reflexively
think about their own children, grandchildren, and other losses that might
lead them to make impermissible value judgments about the defendant
killing a woman and leaving her children motherless.
182 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 823 (1991) ("[Victim impact evidence is not of-
fered to encourage comparative judgments of this kind-for instance, that the killer of a hard-
working, devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate
does not.").
183 Kreitzberg, supra note 128, at 35.
184 Id.
I85 Id.
I86 Id.
187 See Frankel, supra note 22, at 119-21; Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim
Impact Statements, 63 U. CmI. L. REV. 361, 399-402 (1996) (discussing how victim impact evi-
dence can block a juror's ability to hear the defendant's story). But see Paul Gewirtz, Victims
and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 142-43 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (arguing that victim
impact evidence statements serve as a vehicle for evidence not otherwise released at trial).
For a discussion on the interaction of race and victim impact evidence, see Frankel, supra
note 22, at I18-22 (arguing that victim impact evidence gives jurors "a tool in which to voice
their prejudices").
188 State v. Leon, 132 P3d 462,467 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006).
189 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The defendant made a comparative worth argument in Kelly, contending
that the lengthy, emotional video created the potential for jurors to make
comparisons between him and the victim.'" The defendant also argued
that the video created an environment for racial prejudices to manifest
themselves in the jury's sentencing decision.19' On appeal, the court held
that nothing in the record supported either of the defendant's claims.192
The court's blanket ruling failed to take into account the moving tribute
made to "Sarah's people" at the end as the victim's mother described the
land where Sarah's ancestors lived. This explicit reference to the victim's
Canadian Blackfoot Indian heritage, not otherwise necessarily obvious
from the photographs, arguably created the potential for impermissible
inferences between the victim and the defendant, an African American.
The financial ability of the victim's family also presents the potential
for an equal protection violation because families who can afford to spend
more on the video can create better videos that are more creative and more
compelling than a simple slide show of photographs. Tom Handley, an
assistant public defender in Minnesota, argues that "[better videos] can
skew things-a person from a well-to-do family is better able to capture
the imagination of the judge because they can put together a video that's
inflammatory or very compelling."' The same categories of defendants
can be drawn: defendants who have victim impact videos introduced
against them may be said to have killed worthier members of society than
defendants who do not have videos introduced at trial. Victims whose
families are unable to afford videos may be considered less-worthy than
those whose families can afford to create a video. One potential danger of
this division is that more protections will be provided to the upper-class
than to the poor.'94 Another danger is the potential to exacerbate the racial
and economic disparities often present in capital cases. 9 s
F Short Fallings of Courts to Properly Consider Evidence
Courts repeatedly fail to accurately apply the five challenges discussed
above to the unique nature of victim impact evidence videos. They are
willing to overlook the inherently emotional nature of these videos and
often find that even if one part of the video was admitted in error, it was
190 People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 572 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (zoo8).
i91 Id.
I92 Id.
193 Jaksic, supra note 163.
194 Don J. DeBenedictis, Victim Video: Coming to a Trial Near You?, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT, Feb. 14, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 7097078 (The article quotes Stephen
B. Bright, a defense attorney, as saying: "'It enhances the danger that people from upper-class
families will receive greater protection ... than people in housing projects.").
195 Id.
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harmless error, and thus, the defendant was not denied his constitutional
right to due process. Courts are also willing to stretch the limits of relevancy
and ignore the "brief glimpse" mandate from Payne. Even when certain
elements like music are deemed irrelevant, they are frequently unwilling
to find error. Furthermore, courts are even less likely to seriously entertain
confrontation or equal protection arguments.
By failing to meaningfully evaluate defendants' claims against victim
impact videos, courts set a precedent that victim impact videos are generally
admissible and ignore the evidence's unique capacity to emotionally charge
the jury and lead to an unconstitutional application of the death penalty.
Thus, the "time has come for [the Supreme] Court to provide the courts
across the country with a clear rule prohibiting the admission of victim
impact videotapes at a capital penalty trial."'9
IV. DRAWING THE LINE: A BRIGHT-LINE RULE
AGAINST VICTIM IMPACT VIDEO MONTAGES
In Kelly's petition for certiorari, he described the Supreme Court of
California's ruling as marking the "outer limit of decisions" regarding victim
impact videos and called upon the Supreme Court to "establish meaningful
controls" on the types of permissible victim impact evidence, especially
in light of continuing technological advances.1 97 Given the unsatisfactory
nature of courts' responses to the various challenges defendants can bring
against victim impact videos, a bright-line rule barring the admission of
video montages should be adopted. This rule would eliminate the problem
of courts admitting overly emotional videos, while respecting the rule
of Payne and still providing for other forms of permissible victim impact
evidence like still photographs, oral testimony, and written statements.
This section explores the rationale behind a bright-line rule.
A. Victim Impact Videos Violate the "Fundamental Fairness" of Due Process
Payne did not eliminate all constitutional barriers to victim impact
evidence.91 s In fact, it recognized the potential for victim impact evidence
to create a fundamentally unfair trial and held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the vehicle for relief.'" Traditionally,
fundamental fairness can only be determined ex post on the facts of a given
case, requiring attorneys to engage in rigorous pre-trial litigation to limit or
196 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 20.
197 Id. at 4.
198 Matthew L. Engle, Due Process Limitations on Victim Impact Evidence, 13 CAP. DEF. J.
55, 56 (2000).
199 Payne v. Tennessee, 5o U.S. 8o8, 825 (1991); see also id. at 831 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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exclude the evidence to prevent the possibility of a due process violation.o
Video montages are inherently different forms of evidence, however, and
their unique characteristics justify an ex ante rule barring their admission.
1. The Effect of a Non-traditional Form of Evidence on Cross Examination.-
Courts are split on whether capital defendants have the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses in capital sentencing trials. 01 When it is
available, however, cross-examination has been referred to as the "'greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."'2 0 Yet, there is no
practical method to cross-examine a video, which begs the question: who
should be subjected to the cross-exam? The family members who made
or conceptualized the video? The video production company who choose
to include specific cinematic effects? The answer is unclear, although the
questions demonstrate the fundamental inconsistency of victim impact
videos as part of the traditional adversarial system.
As at least one scholar points out, a forceful cross-examination of an
impactwitness regarding a victim's flaws is not "the most tactful approach,"2 0 3
and drawing attention to an emotionally compelling video fares no better.
Jurors may find a harsh cross-examination of the designers or creators of the
moving tributes off-putting. Yet, regardless of tact, a defendant may find
it appropriate to question specific cinematic effects and artistic choices.
In those jurisdictions where cross-examination is allowed, victim impact
videos deny the defendant the ability to exercise their constitutional rights.
2. The Effect of Cumulative Evidence.-Federal Rule of Evidence 403
allows a judge to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if the evidence's
probative value is substantially outweighed by "needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."20 Victim impact videos are often little more than
visual representations of testimony from the guilt phase of the trial, shown
in addition to live victim impact testimony. In Bramit, the court noted that
many of the twenty still photographs featured in the video montage had
already been admitted during the guilt phase of the trial, and thus, the
video was simply previously admitted evidence presented "in a different
medium."205 But if the evidence has already been admitted in the guilt
200 Engle, supra note 198, at 76.
201 Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1255 (I 1th Cir. 1982) (finding a right
to cross-examine during capital sentencing when necessary to ensure the reliability of the
witness's testimony), rith Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932,939(4th Cir. 1990) (finding no
right to cross-examine in capital sentencing).
202 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quotation omitted).
203 Erica A. Schroeder, Comment, Sounds of Prejudice: Background Music During Victim
Impact Statements, 58 U. KA. L. REV. 473, 482 (2010).
2o4 FED. R. EvID- 403-
205 People v. Bramit, 2io P 3d 1171, 1187 (Cal. 2oo9).
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phase, it is irrelevant to the sentencing decision; the jurors already know
who the victim was and what the victim looked like and, to some extent,
have already humanized him or her.20
In Kelly, the victim's mother testified in both the guilt and penalty
phases and provided the jurors with lots of details regarding her daughter's
life and character.2 07 Although the court in Kelly found that the video was
not duplicative, 08 the court in Salazar noted that "[elven if not technically
cumulative, an undue amount of this type of evidence can result in unfair
prejudice under Rule 403."11 If a video only reinforces information already
presented, the video is irrelevant and cumulative.
In addition to being cumulative, a victim impact video is an
uninterrupted form of evidence that can go on ad nauseum. The video
admitted in Kelly was twenty minutes long, in addition to extensive
testimony from the victim's mother.2 10 Not only does this compound the
cumulative nature of the evidence, but it also serves to enhance the risk of
an arbitrary application of a death sentence. Although Payne did not assign
a length of time to a "brief glimpse," a twenty-minute, emotionally charged
memorializing video should be considered outside the scope of the Court's
contemplation.
3. Creation and Purpose.-Although the court in Salazar excluded the
video on grounds that it constituted a memorial to the victim, the video
admitted in Kelly was "nearly identical."2"' The video in Kelly, however,
was not created for the victim's memorial service, but for the purposes of
litigation."'z Given the striking similarities between the videos in length,
quality, and music, the purpose of creation should not permit admission.
Creating a video with an eye toward litigation does not remove the qualities
of the video that make it fundamentally unfair.
Video montages do not serve the traditional purposes of videos in the
courtroom: depicting a sequence of events as relayed by a witness, showing
how equipment works, the landscape of a particular terrain, or scientific
principles, as well as recordation of testimony.2" In criminal trials, videos
206 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 838 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Just as
defendants know that they are not faceless human ciphers, they know that their victims are
not valueless fungibles....").
207 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 12 ("[Mrs. Farwell] described her
daughter as 'very friendly, very open'; 'academically above average'; 'naive'; popular; [and]
'very pretty."') (citations omitted).
208 People v. Kelly, 171 P 3 d 548, 558 (Cal. 2007), cerf. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2oo8).
209 Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330,336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
210 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 3.
211 Id.atIo.
212 Id. at 3.
213 See Gregory T Jones, Lex, Lies & Videotape, 18 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 613, 614-15
(1996).
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have been used to memorialize confessions and victims' statements, depict
crime scenes, and show criminal activity that has previously been captured
on film.214 Victim impact montages differ even further from day-in-the-
life documentaries which are often used to attack a plaintiffs credibility
by proving that his claims of physical or mental injury are exaggeratedz"'
because they are not live recordings; they are recreations through the lens
of a particular individual or party. Video montages do not demonstrate
unbiased recreations of a crime scene or relay a recorded confession-they
provide information so "emotion-laden in its content that jurors may be
persuaded more by how they feel about the [presentation] than by the
facts of the case."2 16 Adoption of a bright-line rule banning video montages
is even more supportable because these videos are not analogous to other
forms of courtroom videos.
B. Victim Impact Evidence Video Montages are Irrelevant
If evidence at a capital sentencing hearing does not bear on the
defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt," it serves no
constitutional purpose and is irrelevant."' Although the majority in Payne
indicated that the harm caused by the defendant is an important factor that
the jury should take into account, this holding was politically motivated
and not based in legal reasoning. 1""
In discussing the relevancy of victim impact evidence, Justice Stevens's
dissent in Payne identified two fundamental flaws: the defendant's lack of
knowledge of the victim at the time of the crime and the inability of a
court to meaningfully evaluate the quantity and quality of the evidence
necessary to elicit a jury's death sentence.' Although Justice Souter's
statement that "[m]urder has foreseeable consequences" is correct, courts
should not view these consequences as "imbue[d] . . . with direct moral
relevance"z because victim impact videos will overwhelmingly contain
elements that were not foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the
214 Id. at 630-31.
215 Id. at 635.
216 Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements: Im-
p/ications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 1o PSYCHOL. PuB. Poll & L. 492, 493-94 (2004).
217 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 858 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987)).
218 See id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today's majority has obviously been moved
by an argument that has strong political appeal but no proper place in a reasoned judicial
opinion."). Justice Stevens is referring to the victims' rights movement of the 1980s. For dis-
cussions of this movement, see Kennedy, supra note zo, at 1072-73. See also Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the political impact of the victims'
rights movement); Johnson, supra note 21, at 8I2-14 (discussing victims' rights amendments).
219 Payne, 501 U.S. at 86o-6i (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
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murder and thus have no bearing on his moral responsibility. Many victim
impact videos, even those not created as eulogies, are highly personalized
to the victim's specific tastes and interests."' The prosecution's ability to
use cinematic evidence enables the prosecution to humanize the victim.
This is implicit permission from the court to the jury that the jury, when
making its death determination, is permitted to consider unforeseeable
characteristics of the victim as foreseeable to the defendant.
Furthermore, members of the Court have stated that when the jury has
discretion, especially in a capital case, "that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action."2 2 By allowing the jury to consider emotionally charged,
highly personalized and memorializing videos with unfettered discretion,
courts cannot make meaningful reviews of whether the evidence
improperly encouraged "reliance on emotion and other arbitrary factors
[that] necessarily prejudice[d] the defendant." 23
C. What is Acceptable? Removing the Balancing Act
Since Payne, the Supreme Court has not ruled further on the acceptable
scope of victim impact evidence. While Payne was not limited to its facts, it
is doubtful the Supreme Court intended Payne "to effect as fundamental a
change in the substance of evidence at a capital trial as that presented by
the orchestrated, eulogy-like videotape" in Kelly and other victim impact
video cases.2 24 Payne only contemplated testimony by the victim's family
members and comments regarding the victim by the prosecutor in closing
argument; it did not reach the implications of cinematic impact evidence.
The video in Kelly, considerably longer than others admitted," goes far
beyond Payne's "brief glimpse" and provides a detailed chronology of the
victim's life. 26
Although not every video contains the dramatic and emotional
cinematic elements as the one admitted in Kelly, many do, and this forces
courts to continue to make decisions based upon the particular elements of
the video. While this may be acceptable for other forms of evidence, a post
221 See Videotape, supra note 6 (including the victim's favorite music, hobbies, holidays,
and tributes to her heritage).
222 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell & Ste-
vens, JJ.).
223 Payne, 501 U.S. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224 Petition for Writ of Certiorari,supra note 5, at 7.
225 Compare People v. Kelly, 171 P3d 548, 557 (Cal. 2oo7), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564
(2oo8) (admitting a twenty-minute video), and People v. Prince, 156 P.3d loi5, io91 (Cal.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. i io6 (2oo8) (admitting a twenty-five minute video), rith Whittle-
sey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250-51 (Md. 1995) (admitting a ninety-second video), and State v.
Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 750-51 (N.M. 1999) (admitting a three-minute videotape).
226 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 8.
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hoc determination of the impact of a certain video will be an impossible
task."' Recent scholarship has advocated for a bright-line rule barring
musical accompaniment to victim impact videos as the music is "irrelevant
and highly prejudicial" and results in prejudiced decision-making and a
fundamentally unfair trial.2 While this argument is well taken,229 it does
not go far enough. Removing the music may remove some of the video's
emotional impact, but the emotional impact factor of individual components
is not quantifiable; barring the video altogether ensures rational and even-
handed decision-making.
A bright-line rule eliminates the arbitrariness regarding which elements
of a video are acceptable and which ones are not. Even if the photos have
already been introduced at the guilt phase and are not accompanied by
music, the solemnity of a capital sentencing trial can infect even the
simplest, most basic of slide shows with undue emotion.
D. Removing the Arbitratiness
Drawing a bright-line rule against victim impact videos would still
respect the ruling of Payne by permitting other forms of victim impact
evidence (oral testimony, written statements, or still photos) to be
admitted. The rule would, however, avoid "the injection of excessive
emotionalism into the capital sentencing process, because the point of film
is to manipulate the emotions of the viewer." 3 0 Studies have shown that
jurors are more likely to recall information if presented in visual format,2 1
and when injected with emotional elements like music and video feed,
jurors are arguably more likely to use the video impermissibly.
Victims' families can manipulate the video as technology advances,
creating powerful images and arousing strong emotions through strategic
crescendos of music, artfully timed panoramic scenes, and close-ups of
particular photographic elements.232 By removing the video montage from
227 Myers & Greene, supra note 216, at 511.
228 Schroeder, supra note 203, at 474.
229 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 17 ("No court would permit musi-
cal accompaniment to a victim's courtroom testimony, therefore, the use of music cannot be
justified as the background to victim impact evidence in a different medium.").
230 Id. at 15.
231 Id. at 15-16; see also David B. Hennes, Comment, Manufacturing Evidence for Trial:
The Prejudicial Implications of Videotaped Crime Scene Reenactments, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2173
n.292 (1994); id. at 2180 ("A television videotape, much more than other forms of demonstra-
tive visual evidence, leaves a lasting impression on jurors' mental processes, since its vivid-
ness dictates that it will be readily available for cognitive recall."); People v. Dabb, 197 P.2d
1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (recognizing "the forceful impression made upon the minds of the jurors" by
motion pictures).
232 This type of image manipulation is frequently referred to as the "Ken Burns Effect."
See Regina McCombs, Meaning in Motion: Ken Burns and His "Effect," POYNTER (June 21, 2007,
876 [Vol. 99
2010-2011 DRAWING THE LINE AT PUSHING "PLAY
the prosecutor's victim impact arsenal, defendants can be assured that
technological advances will not lead to arbitrary applications of the death
penalty. Capital sentencing trials are not theatrical productions, and the
decision to impose death should not be based upon the skills of a particular
videographer.m3
Following Justice Stevens's mandate of "reasonable limits,"M Professor
Regina Austin proposed seven recommendations and conclusions in an
effort to define the boundaries of admission. 35 These recommendations
include limitations on time,236 content,"' music, 38 and persons able to
submit victim impact videos as evidence . 3 Austin further proposes that
courts rule on the admissibility of a particular video pre-trial and argues that
defendants should always receive advance notice of the prosecution's intent
to introduce the video.2? Finally, Austin cautions courts to ensure they
understand victim impact videos for what they are: subjective viewpoints
about the victim's life as interpreted by all of those involved in the video's
creation. 241 While these recommendations may be workable in noncapital
cases, the threat of an arbitrary death sentence remains too great to risk a
video montage's admission. "Reasonable limits" in capital sentencing trials
should limit the type of evidence to exclude victim impact videos instead
of defining the boundaries of the video itself.
12:54 PM), http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id= ioi &aid= 125153.
233 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 19.
234 Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 567 (2oo8) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
235 Regina Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What Should be Made of Vic-
tim Impact Videos?, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 979, 1014-16 (2010).
236 Id. at 1014 ("Victim impact videos or photo montages should be short, no longer than
three to five minutes. A little bit of video goes a long way.").
237 Id. at 1014-15 ("The content should be probative of the issues pertinent to sen-
tencing in the particular case. It should be directed at: (i) highlighting the victim's unique
qualities . . . as evidenced by specific acts, behavior, or events; and (2) describing the impact
of the victim's death on survivors as evidenced by their history of interaction with the victim.
... Beyond that, the video should not be misleading, confusing, redundant of other evidence,
or unnecessary.").
238 Id. at 1015 ("Music should be allowed only if it has a factual basis in the victim's
tastes, preferences, activities, hobbies, or behavior, or in the relationship between the victim
and her or his survivors.").
239 Id. at 1014 ("The categories of persons permitted to submit videos should be limited
to individuals closely connected to the victim by blood and affinity.").
240 Id. at 1015.
241 Id. at ioi6 ("[Video montages] are representations of reality as captured by the fam-
ily photographer, filmmaker, or videographer; shaped by the editor who chose and arranged
the material; and interpreted by the narrator-all of whom are operating under the influence
of subjective points of view about the victim's life, history, and significance.").
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CONCLUSION
In 2008, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kelly and its companion
case, Zamudio v. California,242 over the dissents of two Justices.243 Justice
Stevens, respecting the denial of certiorari, described victim impact
evidence as "powerful in any form," but he labeled the videos at issue as
"especially prejudicial." " Stevens described the videos as "emotionally
evocative" and noted that the scenes and memories represented happened
long before the crimes were committed and that nothing within the videos
explicitly demonstrated the effect of the crimes on the victims' families.2 45
Furthermore, the moving portrayals of the victims, enhanced by music,
voice-overs, and video footage, were irrelevant to the jury's sentencing
decision and "invited a verdict based on sentiment, rather than reasoned
judgment."246 Stevens compelled the Court to recognize its duty to consider
the limits on victim impact evidence that Payne failed to provide.2 47
Justice Breyer argued that the films' "personal, emotional, and artistic
attributes themselves create the legal problem" because those attributes do
not serve the defined purposes of victim impact evidence but instead serve
only to invite a purely emotional response from the jury.2 48 In fact, Breyer
questioned whether the "minimal probity" of the videos called upon the
need for a due process inquiry because of the films' "disproportionately
powerful emotion."2 4 9 justice Breyer also called upon the Court to grant
certiorari, recognizing the need to provide lower courts with examples of
constitutional victim impact evidence.25 0
242 People v. Zamudio, 181 P3d 105 (Cal. 2oo8), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 567 (2oo8).
243 Kelly v. California, I29 S. Ct. 564, 564 (2oo8) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari); Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 567, 568 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
244 Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 567 (zoo8) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari). With respect to the power of victim impact evidence, Justice Stevens quoted the
following: "As one Federal District Judge put it,'I cannot help but wonder if Payne... would
have been decided in the same way if the Supreme Court Justices in the majority had ever sat
as trial judges in a federal death penalty case and had observed first hand, rather than through
review of a cold record, the unsurpassed emotional power of victim impact testimony on a
jury. It has now been over four months since I heard this testimony [in a codefendant's case]
and the juror's sobbing during the victim impact testimony still rings in my ears. This is true
even though the federal prosecutors in [the case] used admirable restraint in terms of the
scope, amount, and length of victim impact testimony."' Id. at 567 n.3 (citing United States v.
Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2005)).
245 Id. at 567 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 567, 568 (zoo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari).
249 Id.
250 Id.
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DRAWING THE LINE AT PUSHING "PLAY"
By denying certiorari in Kelly and failing to elucidate guidelines on the
scope, content, and medium of constitutionally acceptable victim impact
evidence, the United States Supreme Court effectively endorsed the
permissive approach taken by lower courts in admitting victim impact video
montages. Victim impact videos are irrelevant and their admission leads
to arbitrary sentencing decisions based on emotion, not reason. Drawing a
bright-line rule is never easy; not every video will embrace the cinematic
techniques that play with jurors' heartstrings. Barring admission of video
montages per se is the only way to ensure that defendants' sentences are not
void of rational decision making. This rule respects the original holding in
Payne by permitting other types of victim impact evidence to be admitted.
Victim impact videos like the one in Kelly are a "far cry" from what the
Payne majority contemplated and have no place in the courtroom."s
251 Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 546, 567 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
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